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Figure 1: Columbia lifts off on mission STS-
107. The ‘stack’ consists of the Space Shuttle
(with three main engines burning liquid fuel),
the external tank (large orange vessel)
containing propellant for the Shuttle engines,
and two rocket boosters. Once ignited the
booster rockets cannot be stopped as they
contain a solid propellant [1].
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The NASA Space Shuttle operates
under difficult conditions. It is
subject to  the harshness of space,
severe mechanical, thermal and
aerodynamic loads, and handles high
kinetic and chemical energy. These
are sufficient to explain the physical
failure of Columbia at re-entry early
this year. However, there is more to
failure than the engineering domain.
Dr Dirk Pons (MIPENZ) explores the
contribution of management and
organisational culture. 
The Shuttle (Figure 1) is well designed,
has multiple redundant control and
protective systems, and each mission is
a major management project on its own,
so opportunities for failure should be
rare. That sense of technical and
management success was abruptly
shattered with the spectacular loss of
Columbia and crew during re-entry on 1
February 2003 (Figure 2).
The physical cause was impact with a
piece of soft foam shortly after launch,
which severely damaged the reinforced
carbon-carbon (RCC) panels of the
leading edge of the left wing (Figure 3).
During later re-entry, super heated air penetrated the wing, melting  internal
structures (Figure 4), and upsetting the aerodynamic characteristics. Eventually the
2Figure 2: This video was captured by a Danish
crew operating an AH-64 Apache helicopter near
Fort Hood, Texas. It was taken about 40 sec after
loss of control, and shows the breakup of the main
body of Columbia at an  altitude of about 40 km.
Aerodynamic deceleration would have been about
4g at this point, to rise later to a peak of 7.7g [2].
Figure 3: Soft foam was fired by a gas gun at
supersonic speed onto this rig, which simulates the
leading edge of a space shuttle. The gaping hole that
resulted (centre) shows the type of damage that
Columbia could have sustained at launch (CAIB
Photo by Rick Stiles 2003, www.caib.us).
control system was overwhelmed and Columbia turned sideways into the hypersonic
airflow, which ripped it apart. 
Now that the physical root cause is
known, the remedy seems quite
simple: prevent the foam from
detaching in the first place. This is
quite easily done by removing it, and
placing heaters in its place to
prevent ice build-up (the foam is an
insulator for the cryogenic
propellants).  As a back-up solution,
have future astronauts inspect all
leading edges when on orbit, and
provide them with the capability to
repair RCC panels on orbit. Problem
solved? 
Not quite. The failure of any
engineering system  is inevitably
finally manifest as a physical failure.
Consequently there is a tendency to search for root causes based only in
engineering mechanics and operator error.  However, there are other subtle
influences. The psychology dimension, involving management, personality and
organisational behaviour, makes potentially large contributions to system failure [4]. 
In the case of Columbia the startling conclusion is that management practice was to
blame for the foam detachment.
To make the links from management to foam, we need to start with the foam. It is
placed on the external tank to
insulate the cryogenic liquid
oxygen and hydrogen,
preventing ice build up on the
outside. Unfortunately, small
pieces of foam come off at most
launches, due to the supersonic
airflow and imperfections within
the foam. Every Space Shuttle
flight has been damaged by
impact with debris at launch,
though not necessarily by foam
alone, and sustains an average
143 debris strikes per launch,
with most of these on the lower
surface, and most less than an
inch in diameter [2: 122]. NASA
engineers and managers began
to see debris damage as
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they began to perceive the Space Shuttle as a physically robust operational vehicle
rather than a research and development one. A similar perspective had contributed
to the loss of Challenger many years ago. 
The worst culprit for foam detachment was the bipod attachment. This connects the
external tank to the nose of the Space Shuttle. The foam here is thicker, is laid up by
hand and therefore has internal imperfections (elsewhere it is laid up by machine),
stands proud of the surface, and there are complex air flows over this region.  Major
pieces of bipod foam have detached on at least six missions prior to fateful mission
STS-107. 
Two missions prior to STS-107, Atlantis flew mission STS-112 and bipod foam
detached, causing  significant damage to a Solid Rocket Booster [2: 124]. The
technical experts recommended that the STS-112 incident be treated as an 'in-flight
anomaly'. However, shuttle managers declined, and instead classified it as a matter
requiring non-critical investigation. The CAIB wondered: 'Why did they take the
unprecedented step of scheduling not one but eventually two missions to fly before
the External Tank Project was to report back on foam losses?' [2: 125].
From a management perspective, the disadvantage of a  'in-flight anomaly' is that it
requires a major investigation, which can delay or even ground the next few
launches.  With a rationale that was 'seriously flawed', some 'sleight-of-hand'
statistics, and 'with no engineering analysis, Shuttle managers used past success as
a justification for future flights' [2: 126]. The way was now clear for any future foam
strikes to be considered simply a maintenance issue. When Columbia  mission STS-
107 was being reviewed for flight readiness, the outstanding foam issue from STS-
112 was not even discussed by engineers and managers. 
Why did presumably excellent managers marginalise the risk of the foam problem?
The answer is that there was 'pressure to meet an increasingly ambitious launch
schedule' [2: 131]. This came about since NASA's financial backers, the White
House and Congress, had put NASA on financial probation back in 2001, requiring
the completion of the core of the International Space Station (ISS) failing which the
ISS would not be developed further. The target was to launch 'node 2' (a docking
adapter for European and Japanese modules) and thereby get to 'core complete' by
a specific date: 19 February 2004. This date was suggested as feasible by project
planning at the time.
Simultaneous with setting this target, a new appointment was made to the top post in
NASA. A new organisational culture began to flow down from senior management, 
creating different organisational behaviour in middle managers and engineers. A
large amount of management meeting content  was devoted to the schedule margin
(the number of days delay that could be accommodated without adversely affecting
the target launch),  and 'any suggestions that it would be difficult to meet that launch
date were brushed aside' [2: 117]. A fixed and tight schedule of Shuttle launches was
required to meet an International Space Station date that was technically arbitrary
but politically important for senior managers. Unfortunately, the schedule margin kept
evaporating.  To compensate, some testing was reduced, more tasks were done
4concurrently, and a third work shift was added [2: 132]. The launch schedule became
increasingly compressed and critical as the target date approached. By the end of
2002 there was zero margin left. 
With a new organisational culture preoccupied with schedule, rational people started
interpreting old things differently. Many of the Shuttle program managers who were
involved with STS-107, the final flight of Columbia, had been involved with the
previous missions and the decisions about foam. When it was found out mid-mission
that  Columbia had sustained a large foam strike, the management team
marginalised the severity. The CAIB was severely critical of the STS-107 mission
Chair, stating that 'most of Linda Ham's inquiries about the foam strike were not to
determine what action to take during Columbia's mission, but to understand the
implications for [the next mission] STS-114 [for which she would be a manager
again]' [2: 139].
With the schedule pressure entrenched in the organisational culture, the 'Shuttle
Program management declined to have the crew inspect the Orbiter for damage,
declined to request on-orbit imaging, and ultimately discounted the possibility of a
burn-through' [2: 127].  During the mission Ham stated that 'it's not really a factor
during the flight because there is not much we can do about it' [2: 147]. These were
deliberate decisions, i.e. errors of commission, and persistent in that managers
missed several opportunities to make alternative decisions. Ham even actively
ordered a halt to requests for telescope imaging of Columbia, because the requests
had not first gained her permission, and the necessary repositioning of Columbia
would affect the mission schedule [2: 153]. There were other aspect of poor
organisational behaviour, like managers and engineers putting more emphasis on
their relationships or command structures than on their own professional diligence.
Large organisations all experience office politics, but it is tragic that pathological
organisational behaviour contributed to this accident. The CAIB report concludes
with stinging criticism of the Mission Management Team for Columbia, their lack of
effective leadership, their  lack of interest in solving problems other than schedule,
and their behaviour in keeping dissenting views at bay. Managers defence was that
'if engineers had a safety concern, they were obligated to communicate their
concerns to management'. However, CAIB stated that  'Managers did not seem to
understand that as leaders they had a corresponding and perhaps greater obligation
to create viable routes for the engineering community to express their views and
receive information' [2: 169].
It is easy to demonise the Shuttle managers, to view their actions as abnormal, 
reprehensible, professionally negligent, and alien to anything we would do in similar
circumstances. However, that would be unfair use of hindsight, and perhaps even
dishonest. What can we learn from Columbia?
In my opinion, the lessons are:
(1) Leaders (e.g. the senior management team) need to be aware that the key
performance indicators (in this case schedule) that they set will subtly change
the behaviour and decision making priorities of subordinates. Excessive focus
on the bottom line can compromise professional due diligence.
5(2) Managers must correct for the fact that subordinates will interpret specific
directives as taking precedence over standard organization procedures (e.g.
safety), sometimes resulting in violation of those procedures [3].
(3) Leaders and managers need to be aware that their position gives them the
authority to marginalise and ignore contrary points of view that are 
inconsistent with their beliefs. However, such beliefs may lack robustness and
validity. Leaders and managers must maintain their intellectual curiosity and
skepticism [2: 181]. 
(4) Organisational success will cause unjustified optimism, complacency, and
desensitisation to risk, unless leaders actively de-bias the organisation. 
(5) Leaders must encourage minority opinions, and if these are not present  the
responsibility for a thorough and critical examination falls back on them [2:
183]. Leaders must ensure that adequate communication channels exist, and
the organisational culture does not informally penalise those with
reservations. 
(6) There must be a separation of technical and management authority in safety
matters. 
The CAIB concluded that the 'organizational culture has as much to do with this
accident as the foam' [2: 97]. Leaders have a responsibility to ensure that the
organisational culture, which originates with them, is not adversely affected by their
politics, personalities or relationships. The common practice of raising up an inner
circle of supportive and like-minded people seems an increasingly fragile leadership
concept.  Leaders would do better to encourage cognitive and personality diversity,
as a dynamic organisation ('learning organisation') needs to encourage openness
and find value in disagreements [5: 543]. 
The conclusion from Columbia is that leaders and managers of all organisations
need to be more aware their potent effect on organisational behaviour, and how that
in turn can drive complex engineering systems to catastrophic failure. 
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